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One of the few unambiguously positive outcomes of the Bush years is that it has encouraged greater interest in the practice of democracy promotion. The expansion of scholarship in this area has not been matched by an equal expansion in its scope, however. There continues to be an overwhelming tendency to focus exclusively on empirical case studies and policy prescriptions, usually informed by a set of unstated liberal assumptions. Nothing is necessarily wrong with this per se. The problem stems from the lack of attention directed towards the larger theoretical and conceptual frameworks that inform and shape these practices. Responding to this state of affairs, the paper examines the way certain theoretical tendencies and commitments have helped give rise to many problematic aspects of liberal democracy promotion. It is necessary to challenge the restrictive framework that currently dominates. It is argued that to do so entails rethinking, extending and pluralising the way democracy itself is conceived.












A commonly observed feature of the post-Cold War world has been the ideational dominance of liberal democracy. Indeed, a characteristic aspect of the so-called “velvet revolutions” that marked the beginning of this period in the 1989 was their distinctly anti-utopian nature.​[2]​ No new political economic models were floated, as capitalist liberal democracy was widely accepted as the sole route to “normality”. For some these events reinforced a growing belief that democracy may truly be considered a “universal value”,​[3]​ for others democracy had achieved its ascendant position almost by default, reflective more of the failure of alternatives.​[4]​ Underpinning liberal democracy’s ideational strength has been a geo-political environment favouring a core group of industrially advanced, established liberal democracies, with the United States as the self appointed vanguard of this global democratic movement. One consequence of this constellation of forces has been the rise of a much more expansive and assertive liberal democracy promotion agenda, which has been institutionalised and embedded in the foreign policies of the United States, the European Union, as well as many other states and international organisations. In this regard, the policies of the recent Bush administration should not be mistaken as an aberration from past practice, as the “freedom agenda” was essentially an extension (albeit a considerable one) of pre-existing trends.

Following the failure and discrediting of the “Bush Doctrine”, democracy promotion is now more contested than it was during the liberal zeitgeist of the early 1990s. If it appears that McFaul was too quick to suggest that an international norm supporting democracy promotion had emerged,​[5]​ it would be equally mistaken to overstate the extent and potential impact of the backlash currently underway. In the case of the most prominent actor, the United States, a long standing foreign policy tradition of fostering democracy abroad combines with an institutionalised – and growing – democracy promotion “bureaucracy”,​[6]​ which suggests it is likely these practices will continue. More broadly, democracy has become an important form of legitimisation for states. This is unlikely to change anytime soon, despite the growing strength of China and Russia, powers that threaten to unsettle the putative liberal democratic consensus. Indeed, one must be careful not to over exaggerate the changes brought about by recent events, as there are strong continuities between the liberal zeitgeist following the fall of the Berlin wall and the contemporary international environment. Crucially, democracy promotion remains an essentially liberal project, and even if weakened, liberalism still remains hegemonic.

Despite the rapid growth in democracy promotion practices over the last three decades, scholarship has lagged noticeably behind. This likely stems in part from long standing assumptions on both sides of the disciplinary divide. Comparativists working on democratisation have tended to emphasise internal factors, regarding external influences as secondary and largely inconsequential.​[7]​ It is only recently that this habit has begun to change. Meanwhile, the reactive nature of the discipline of International Relations has again been illustrated through the sharp spike in interest in democracy promotion following the prominent place it was accorded in the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Despite the growing amount of knowledge generated, a majority of the literature has limited itself to considering specific policies and empirical cases. In contrast, little attention has been given to the deeper theoretical and conceptual issues that inform these practices. The result has been an incomplete and overly restrictive view, one that has been poorly equipped to deal with many of the difficulties that now define the democracy promotion agenda.





The Theoretical Underpinnings of Liberal Democracy Promotion

There has been a long standing tension in international politics between, on the one hand, principles of sovereign equality, and on the other, standards of international legitimacy that gravitate towards certain forms of state. Placed in this broader context, contemporary democracy promotion practices can be seen as the latest – and perhaps most explicit – manifestation of a more general desire for a degree of homogeneity amongst states.​[8]​ The contributing factors behind the rise of democracy promotion over the last three decades are deeply interconnected (and well known): the momentum generated by the “third wave” of democratisation, the collapse of the communism as a complete political economic alternative, the ideational dominance of liberalism, a genuinely widespread desire for democracy (in a broad sense) and often specifically liberal democracy (regularly equated with material wealth and freedom),  a deepening of globalisation, as well as the appearance of a unipolar system presided over by a liberal democratic great power. This unique constellation of historical forces remarkably favourable to liberal internationalism and the spread of democracy greatly affected perceptions about democracy’s present and future, raising hopes for the possibility a completely democratic world, and the prospect that it might not be as far away as had previously been presumed.​[9]​ 





Key actors seeking to support democracy abroad, such as United States, have tended to understand it in a rather specific manner. The variation that exists between Western democracies – the United States and Scandinavian countries for instance – is reduced significantly when fostering it elsewhere, as the desired end point of transitions has been a certain type of liberal democracy. The universalistic rhetoric within which democracy promotion is regularly couched tends to obscure the particularity of the version that is being advocated. It is a form of liberal democracy in which liberalism exerts a dominating influence. This is a conception in which the egalitarian tendencies of democracy are restrained and limited. Democracy is defined in procedural or minimalist terms, with politics being essentially limited to contestation between elites for people’s votes. Moreover, democracy is contained in the political sphere; the economic realm is wholly separate, regarded as a necessary partner of democracy but not subject to it. Lipset and Larkin stress this point: “democracy is a system of political rights”.​[11]​ 





The scope and intensity of the third wave of democratisation, reaching across much of the globe, tapped into a deeply rooted liberal faith in the idea of progress.​[13]​ The highly contingent and fortunate nature of liberal democracy’s “triumph” was quickly forgotten, as a Whiggish narrative was constructed.​[14]​ Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis perfectly reflected and informed the post-Cold War liberal zeitgeist.​[15]​ Few agreed wholesale with his argument, but many continue to accept it in a qualified form, with his historical narrative asserting liberal democracy’s superiority resonating widely.​[16]​ Indeed, Fukuyama represents only the extreme version of a much more common phenomenon. As Žižek observes, “it is easy to make fun of Fukuyama’s notion of the End of History, but the dominant ethos today is ‘Fukuyamaian’: liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society.”​[17]​ This faith may have been slightly shaken by recent events, but it has proven remarkably resilient. Consider Michael Mandelbaum’s latest prediction: 
Without a major dislocation in the life of the planet, and in particular in the social, economic, and political conditions prevailing in the wealthiest and freest of its societies, therefore, the rise of global democracy ... is likely to continue well into the twenty-first [century].​[18]​







The nature of the third wave of democratisation encouraged a rethinking of what was necessary for states to democratise. Modernisation theory now appeared far too conservative. Karl and Schmitter put this in particularly strong terms: “what the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived in the future as the outcomes of different types of democracy.”​[21]​ Countries no longer needed to be “ready” to attempt democratisation. The early examples of Southern Europe pointed to agency, not structure, as the key determiner. From these initial cases emerged a voluntarist model of transition, based on elite pacting between the old regime and new democratic forces. This would subsequently serve as an important template for later transitions.​[22]​ The breadth of the third wave reinforced a growing consensus that agency was more determinative than socio-economic conditions, as the unexpected and drastic rise in transitional countries drastically altered conceptions about the possibilities for democratisation. Representative was Diamond’s suggestion that, “there are numerous grounds to resist an emphasis on societal preconditions. Democratization is triggered mainly by political factors”.​[23]​ In this formulation the key preconditions are no longer socio-economic, but political will and the possibility for agency.





A small step from stressing the role of agency in democratic transitions is suggesting that external actors may have greater influence in these processes than previously thought. They can do so either by assisting domestic forces with funding and other forms of support, or intervening more directly. The highly contingent nature of transitional moments, when the potential for agency to be determinative is at its greatest, allows for outsiders to potentially play a crucial role. This is proposed by Diamond: “the precarious balance of political and social forces in many newly democratic and transitional countries” provides “international actors … real scope to influence the course of political development.”​[25]​ Thus, not only has democracy promotion become more possible with the constraints of the Cold War removed, the prevalence of a voluntarist understanding of democratic transitions is one that may actually encourage external intervention of some sort. 

There is still a widespread acceptance that democratisation must ultimately be internally generated and sustained, but there has been a broadening acceptance of the role played by external actors in these processes. At one extreme, military intervention – such as in Iraq – is based on the presumption that once a key obstacle is removed – e.g. Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime – democratisation can occur. In the case of the colour revolutions, external actors mobilised in a wide range of ways: supplying funding and logistical support to opposition groups, providing training and advice on resistance strategies, making diplomatic threats to those resisting democratisation, ensuring the presence of election monitors as a method of generating the “spark” that would encourage mass social action when the rigging of the election has been made apparent.​[26]​ Moving from the transition to consolidation phase, external actors can provide a wide array of aid programs and support to assist in these processes. Democratisation may ultimately be an internal process, but external forces can strongly influence when, and how, it will occur.

Continuities and Contradictions in Liberal Democracy Promotion

A powerful vision and rationale for democracy promotion was thus consolidated during the liberal zeitgeist of the 1990s, and it continues to influence current practices and understandings. The consequences of 9/11 still resonate throughout the democracy promotion community, yet one must be careful not to overstate what change has occurred: it has been one of degree, not type. Admittedly, the present climate is not as favourable. Scholars have noted that there is currently a “democratic recession”, which has interacted closely with a growing backlash against democracy promotion.​[27]​ The advent of more challenging circumstances has not led, however, to a major rollback of these practices. Democracy promotion has become too institutionalised in the policy of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and other international actors for this to happen. In this regard, it is noteworthy that even though President Obama has shied away from his predecessor’s “freedom agenda”, it appears there has actually increased the amount of funding devoted towards the cause.​[28]​ It would be improbable, if not impossible, for Obama to abandon democracy promotion completely. 

The failure of Bush’s “freedom agenda” has been identified primarily as a problem with how policy was formulated and implemented. In true liberal fashion, it has been reduced to a technocratic matter. For example, both Carothers and Diamond – prominent analysts closely linked to policymaking circles – have called for a reworking of U.S. democracy promotion strategy, following the missteps and mistakes of the Bush era.​[29]​ In advocating the necessity of encouraging democracy in the Arab world, Diamond suggests, “Bush was substantially right in framing the problem, but has been disastrously wrong in the unilateral, blunt and blundering means with which he has tried to bring it about.”​[30]​ This is a somewhat superficial assessment, however. It is necessary to ask more probing questions, such as: what elements of the liberal democracy promotion agenda enabled it to be directed towards the more radical means and ends adopted by the Bush administration? Current problems go well beyond issues of means and implementation. While the logic presented above is reasonably cohesive, there are some very real inconsistencies, tensions and blind spots, which translate into how these policies and practices are subsequently formulated. It is necessary to dig deeper.

Coercive Democratisation and Liberal Democracy Promotion as a Security Strategy

Coercive democratisation has become an issue of central concern following American-led regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. One of the most damaging legacies of Bush’s “freedom agenda” has been the subsequent tendency to equate democracy promotion with regime change. Nonetheless, it would be unwise to veer too far in the opposite direction and dismiss these cases as aberrations. Coercive democratisation is not in contradiction with liberal democracy promotion, but actually an outgrowth and extension of the framework developed in the 1990s, as examined above. It commences with the way democracy is conceived. Understanding democracy in procedural terms implies it may be reasonably straightforward to export, as it is reduced to a matter of installing a set of institutions.​[31]​ More expansive conceptions of democracy may be less amenable to this kind of logic. The comparative ease of establishing liberal democracy – when understood in limited, procedural terms – is reinforced by the downplaying of arguments for the necessity of certain socio-economic preconditions. The prevailing activist conception of democratic transitions instead suggests there is no need to wait: any state is “ready” for democracy if sufficient political will is generated. Whereas preconditions arguments suggest scepticism about what external intervention can achieve, the agency-centred approach is one far more amenable to intervention to trigger democratisation. External actors can play a potentially determinative role by helping to facilitate political action. This may encourage coercive democratisation if either the political will is lacking and needs to be generated, or the conditions for agency are prevented by unfavourable local conditions. 

A number of further aspects of the liberal zeitgeist helped to establish conditions conducive for coercive democratisation to emerge as a viable strategy.​[32]​ A wave of liberal theorising inspired by Kant’s Perpetual Peace identified the extension of liberal democracy as the key to creating a more progressive and peaceful international order. Franck argued that there is a “symbiotic linkage among democracy, human rights and peace”, and that democracy contributes to the advancement of the international community’s “most important norm: the right to peace”.​[33]​ With the possibility of a more peaceful international environment, democracy promotion becomes a policy option that has both strong strategic and ethical justification. This combined with the emerging doctrine of a democratic “entitlement” in international law, which works to weaken traditional sovereignty rights and lower the threshold for outside intervention. Given the deeply contested nature of the concept of democracy, and the related problems of codifying it international law,​[34]​ prominent suggestions by liberal jurists of a “right” to democracy existing are deeply problematic, as they pave the way for democratic interventionism and coercive democratisation. They do so by further undermining sovereignty rights and by placing an onus on external actors to uphold democracy elsewhere. The impact of such thinking was evident in the Bush administration. Take, for example, this statement from John Negroponte, former Deputy Secretary of State: “those who are elected democratically ... have a responsibility, to their people and to the international community, to govern democratically. And if they do not, then responsible democracies everywhere must hold them accountable.”​[35]​

Democratic regime change becomes a much more realistic foreign policy option when this different components are combined: a belief that the spread of liberal democracy is the key to a more peaceful and prosperous international order, a putative right to democracy lowers the barrier for justifying intervention, and the transitions paradigm stresses political will is the primary determiner in bringing about change. According to Tony Smith, together “these ideas amounted to a witches’ brew so far as their policy implications were concerned.”​[36]​ Coercive democratisation, and more generally supporting democracy for strategic purposes, became particularly prominent during the Bush era. The terrorist attacks reinforced pre-existing arguments for the strategic necessity of fostering democracy abroad, by force where necessary. The advancement of democracy emerged at the heart of the Bush Doctrine and the “War on Terror”, with the National Security Strategy announcing America’s intention to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom”.​[37]​ At the heart of this project was the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by attempts to install democracy in both situations. There has been significant disagreement over whether these can be classified as cases of coercive democratisation, insofar as it appears that democracy has been used primarily as a post facto rhetorical cover. In a certain sense, this is not so relevant: whether commencing as cases of coercive democratisation or not, this is how the actions of the Bush administration have been perceived and are now judged. These have become examples of coercive democratisation.

Coercive democratisation emerged as a form of democracy promotion in an international environment in which non-democracies have been identified as both “behaviourally” and “ontologically threatening” to liberal democratic states.​[38]​ It is hardly a coincidence that the “rogue state” classification has emerged in the liberal post-Cold War order, defined in contrast to its liberal democratic other. This conceptual coupling of “liberal democracies” and “rogue regimes” – “asymmetrical counter-concepts” in Koselleck’s terminology – can be seen as the latest iteration of the civilised/barbarian pairing.​[39]​ The kind of mentality fostered through this framework, in which the nondemocratic other is not only different, but inferior and dangerous, encourages a climate in which coercive democratisation becomes more likely. Consider these alarmist words from Marc Plattner, co-editor of Journal of Democracy and co-director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies:
Liberal democracy has real and powerful enemies who are bent upon its destruction. We no longer have the luxury of pretending otherwise. Once again, as was the case during the Cold War, the imperative of maintaining our security and our way of life requires that we defend and support democracy.​[40]​
From this perspective, the spread of democracy is desired for defensive, as well as more progressive, reasons. This is essentially a reversal of the older Wilsonian doctrine of making the world safe for democracy, as instead it argues that “only in a world of democracies can the United States be safe.”​[41]​ 

If regime change has recently emerged as one possible method of promoting democracy abroad and protecting it at home, it has been meant as a tactic to be used in specific circumstances. In ascertaining where to possibly intervene to install democracy, it is important recognise the role played a certain reading of the third wave. Recalling the “snowballing effects” of the third wave, it has been proposed that it is not necessary for democracy to be installed in all states, just pivotal ones, or in Diamond’s terminology “strategic swing states”.​[42]​ These will then effectively act as democratic vanguards, kick-starting regional diffusion processes. This logic was used in the case of Iraq by Bush, Rice, Wolfowitz and many neo-conservatives. Condoleezza Rice optimistically proposed that Iraq was “on a road to democracy, which can be a linchpin for changing the nature of a very, very troubled region”.​[43]​ Rather than igniting a wave of democratisation across the Middle East, however, it may have actually retarded democratic development in the region. 

In fostering democracy for primarily self-interested reasons, it is a particular model that is advocated and encouraged in order for U.S. foreign policy goals to be best achieved. Preferred are orderly transitions, which do not greatly challenge or undermine societal structures, leading to a procedural form of democracy limited to the political sphere. Establishing this kind of liberal democracy is best achieved through pacted or negotiated transitions, according to third wave “best practice”. In a conservative vein that corresponds uncannily with attempts by nineteenth century liberals to restrain the onset of mass democracy, pacting offers the model of moving to democracy at the behest of elites, with the part played by the people significantly restricted. The common result has been that a privileged political class, often empowered by external actors, has a major say in determining the shape of the democracy being instituted.​[44]​ Thus, from the very outset, a limited, Schumpeterian understanding is entrenched, where “democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them”.​[45]​ The political space that exists is small, and the room for how democracy is conceived of and practiced is narrow. 

Liberal Democracy Promotion and Hierarchy

There are serious shortcomings and difficulties in the way liberal democracy promotion has developed, ones which extend well beyond the excesses of coercive democratisation and the hubris of the Bush administration. Of particular significance is that these practices have essentially operated as part of a liberal movement away from the equality of states to a more hierarchical system, in which liberal democracies are identified as more legitimate. This is reflected in the way that contemporary democracy promotion practices are embedded within an ideational framework that judges states according to whether they are closer or further away from the telos of liberal democracy. Furthermore, external actors that have reached this stage of liberal democracy identify themselves as having rights to intervene to help democracy elsewhere. With democracy promotion taken to be a “norm”, reflecting the emerging “right” to democratic government in international law,​[46]​ states that oppose attempts by outsiders to influence the shape of domestic governance structures towards (liberal) democracy are at best tolerated, but increasingly identified as delinquent. 

Resistance to external actors intervening to support democracy is equated with the self-interest of a narrow ruling elite, historical backwardness, a failure in reason and understanding, or more often than not, a combination of these. Discounted are justifiable concerns over the fact that democracy promotion remains a largely Western-driven project, driven – at least in part – by self-interested motives that may not be compatible with the needs and desires of local communities. Indeed, given the readily admitted strategic purposes for promoting democracy abroad, it is hardly surprising that many states have reacted with scepticism or outright opposition to these policies. Yet non-liberal democratic states chafing at the prospect of external interference are identified not only regarded as impeding democratisation in that specific context, but also as threatening “to the new democratic consensus within the international system.”​[47]​ This is a reinforcement and extension of the logic of “rogue regimes”: states are threatening because of what they are, and not what they do. In this context, democracy promotion operates within and reinforces this new kind of liberal international hierarchy, one that denies the equality of states, as established liberal democratic states are self-anointed as the most legitimate members of the international community.​[48]​

The hierarchical dimension of this liberal worldview operates in part through establishing a specific (liberal) model of democracy as universal in scope and potential. The breadth of the third wave, in which liberal democracy was widely accepted as the desired telos of transitions, has been taken as a sign of its global appeal. This has been reinforced by opinions polls, such as the Pew Center and World Values surveys, which indicate that democracy is the preferred form of government across the world. These findings are used as evidence for democracy’s near complete universality, which then acts as a further justification for democracy promotion.​[49]​ Lost in such interpretations is the cultural contingency of these survey results, where support for a general, abstract notion of democracy could mean something very different from the specific liberal version that is largely favoured. Yet the deeply embedded assumption that support for democracy naturally means the liberal variant is highly problematic given that conceptions of democracy will always be mediated through local histories, cultures and shared experiences.​[50]​ 

A certain pretence is maintained that the version being promoted is not Western-centric. The manner in which (liberal) democracy is understood – its institutions, foundations, values etc. – suggests otherwise, however. Admittedly practice is noticeably different from the initial post-Cold War period, which was defined by a heady optimism and over-confidence. Democracy promoters tend to now work with a more nuanced view of democracy, but the overarching liberal template remains firmly in place. This can be seen through the shift from emphasising elections – as was the case in the 1980s and early 1990s – to contemporary practice which focuses primarily on rule of law and civil society building.​[51]​ Yet one should be careful not to overstate the consequences of this development on the kind of democracy being promoted. In true technocratic fashion, this is primarily a change in implementation and delivery: the means have altered, the ends have not. Rule of law is emphasised as necessary for institutionalising the constitutional structures liberal democracy requires, while civil society –understood in a specific manner, regularly according to the American experience – is meant to foster liberal democracy from below.​[52]​ There have undoubtedly been developments in attempts to support democracy, yet there is much less evidence of serious change in the fundamental assumptions and beliefs underwriting these practices.

The continuance of a liberal worldview informing and underwriting democracy promotion can further be seen through the reactions to the decidedly mixed outcomes of the third wave. The failure of many third wave democratisers to transit successfully has led to a tendency to classify as incomplete regimes that may exhibit some democratic tendencies but fail to live up to the liberal democratic standard.​[53]​ “Electoral”, “illiberal” and other subtypes are portrayed as inferior and deviant, not as far advanced as liberal democracies, which remain the desired end point. This Whiggish reading, however, glosses over the contingency and violence that marked the foundings of many liberal democracies, and downplays the long, uneven and tumultuous experience of democratisation in the Western core. As Berman correctly notes, “the history of almost all democracies has been filled with turmoil, conflict, and even violence.” ​[54]​ It may be reasonable to expect that these historical processes will now occur in a shorter timeframe, but the contemporary liberal account of democratisation encourages the presumption that the more conflictual, and potentially illiberal, dimensions of democratisation can be bypassed. 

One consequence of this perceived phenomenon of incomplete democratisation has been attempts to assess the “quality” of democracy,​[55]​ which effectively works to reinforce the implicit teleology and hierarchy in thinking on democratic transitions. Unsurprisingly, what counts as a “high quality” democracy looks remarkably like an idealised version of the Anglo-American liberal model. This movement towards classifying democracies shares uncomfortable resemblances to the classical “standard of civilisation”, codified in international law from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, which distinguished ‘civilised’, ‘semi-civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ states, and operated to perpetuate practices of hierarchy, exclusion and violence.​[56]​ While certainly not equivalent, judging and classifying regimes by their “democratic-ness” treads a very slippery slope. Furthermore, it fails to take into account how different historical and cultural contexts interact with processes of democratisation, which complicates attempts to ascertain objective, universal standards for judging the “quality” of democracy. For instance, within democracy there is an ongoing tension between the principles of equality and liberty, which is resolved differently by various democracies. If one regards equality as the supreme test of democracy’s quality, the Anglo-American version of liberal democracy shows notable deficiencies, but if liberty is prioritised this model receives much higher marks.

As well as reinforcing a relationship in which Western democracies are regarded as “superior”, this prevailing logic has also constructed a “dual standard” where established democracies judge the “democratic-ness” of other states but not themselves. Whitehead notes that, “this is not the way liberal internationalism is pictured in standard democratic theory ... [b]ut it is the way Western democracy promotion has generally operated over the past 20 years”.​[57]​ Established democracies are excluded from the data sets of almost all scholarship on democratisation, based on the presumption that democratisation and democracy promotion can only occur in transitional states. Little room is left for the possibility that established democracies may, and indeed do, suffer from similar problems.​[58]​ This stems from a tendency by practitioners and scholars to regard democracy as a finished product, something that has been achieved in the West and is now ready to be exported elsewhere. Václav Havel expresses this with great clarity: 
… democracy is seen less and less as an open system that is best able to respond to people’s basic needs – that is, as a set of possibilities that continually must be sought, redefined, and brought into being. Instead, democracy is seen as something given, finished, and complete as is, something that can be exported like cars or television sets, something that the more enlightened purchase and the less enlightened do not.​[59]​
What Havel points to is the virtue of understanding democracy in a more open manner, as an inherently incomplete and unfinished process. From this perspective, democratisation is an ongoing process for all democracies, not just transitional ones. 

The result of this restrictive and hierarchical framework has been a remarkably uni-directional form of democracy promotion. Changing the terminology from democracy “promotion” to “assistance” or “support” does little to conceal the inherent power structures and inequalities in these practices. Teivainen argues that a key dimension of democracy promotion is a “pedagogy of power” in which external actors assume “the social function of the teacher whose role is to instruct and guide the more ‘child-like’ countries”.​[60]​ This situation is acutely disempowering for local communities, limiting their scope for democratic innovation and agency, as external actors assert a dominant role in shaping democratisation. In this regard, consider Diamond’s conclusions on the possibilities for democratisation in the Middle East: “if we do not press … for democratic reform, it will not happen, and eventually the opportunity the opportunity to steer the region away from a deepening radicalization will be lost.”​[61]​ Such a reading, however, derives from viewing the region solely through the lens of liberal democracy, which inhibits the recognition of other democratic traditions and possibilities indigenous to the Arab world. The privileging of a specific democratic model encourages the prioritisation of the agency and democratic “knowledge” of external actors, having already “achieved” liberal democracy, and therefore more “progressed” than those still seeking to make this transition.


RETHINKING ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Democracy promotion is now at a transitional moment. The deeply divisive “freedom agenda” of the Bush administration helped generate a substantial backlash against a much broader and more diverse set of practices. The growing strength of China and Russia, two non-liberal democratic powers, is further generating an international context far less favourable to the spread and support of democracy compared with the 1990s. Nonetheless, democracy promotion has become a deeply embedded in international politics, and is engaged in by a wide variety of actors: states, international organisations, NGOs and even transnational corporations. And even if the liberal zeitgeist has faded somewhat, democracy still remains the most widely accepted form of government in contemporary politics. As such, it can be expected that democracy promotion will continue into the foreseeable future, which means it is vital to consider how possible it is to move towards a more open, plural and reflexive set of practices. It is argued here that this must begin with expanding how democracy is conceived, and engaging with a much broader range of democratic models.

Paradoxically, the normative and political strength of democracy, which has been fundamental in embedding democracy promotion in international politics, has simultaneously operated to limit how the idea is understood. The widespread consensus over the value of democracy interacts with, and encourages, some of liberalism’s most unreformed Whiggish tendencies. The contingency and specificity of liberal democracy is forgotten or overlooked, as it is taken as a universal good, applicable to all, identified as the best panacea for the problems developing states face. Conceiving of democracy in such terms can, however, suggest a less reflexive and more absolutist set of practices, as the actors encouraging liberal democracy are overly assured of its validity. In this sense, it would be much more productive to move to a position that is more reticent about the virtues of liberal democracy, which questions its necessity and applicability, while simultaneously remaining more open to other democratic possibilities.

Not only is it necessary to denaturalise the liberal democratic model and challenge the overly comfortable and misplaced universalism, democracy promotion practice could benefit from showing more awareness of the different historical contexts within which democratisation takes place. To begin with, clearly states now democratising do so in circumstances significantly different from the first and second waves. Indeed, contemporary cases of democratisation are removed from much of the third wave, which commenced over three decades ago in a notably different geopolitical climate. It is helpful to recall the major reservations the United States had about the Portuguese transition that started the third wave, with the experience initially suggesting democratisation would be a destabilising process that may impact on wider security concerns of the bloc of liberal democracies.​[62]​ The larger point is that if transitions are occurring at different world historical moments, not to mention specific local contexts with their own histories and cultures, it is perhaps misguided to expect that a similar form of democracy can emerge from such variable contexts. It is necessary to revise our conceptions of democracy to adjust to these changed historical circumstances.​[63]​ For example, in the case of the United States, liberal democracy was established in a non-feudal environment remarkably favourable to individual liberty.​[64]​ The result was the formation of a distinctively “Lockean” version of liberal democracy, one in which liberalism has tended to dominate.​[65]​ This model, emphasising the protection of negative freedoms and especially property rights, may be suitable for the United States, but it is dangerous to mistake this particular experience for something more universal. In this regard, Charles Taylor makes the important observation that: 
Transitions to democracy will be very different from each other because the people concerned are moving from very different predemocratic repertories and imaginaries and are often moving to rather different variants of democratic imaginary. And these two phases are naturally linked.​[66]​

Considering how contextual factors may influence the kind of democracy desired in different transitional settings is an important step in opening up the way democracy itself is thought about. An odd situation currently prevails in the thought and practice of democracy promotion, in which there is remarkably little debate or contestation over democracy’s meaning and the forms it can take. In political theory democracy is the quintessential “contested concept”,​[67]​ yet in comparative politics and IR a narrow liberal consensus dominates. An expanded engagement with democratic theory is long overdue. Even staying within liberalism, alternate versions of liberal democracy could be considered in a more comprehensive and systematic manner. While often incorporating broader dimensions of welfare liberalism into their democracies at home, abroad the United States and many other actors tend to work with a far more restrictive conception that emphasises negative liberties, a limited state and prioritises the economic sphere. There are alternate liberal traditions, however, with more expansive notions of liberty and community, which may be better suited in certain settings. Furthermore, the grave socio-economic problems and inequalities found in many transitional countries may call for a form of democracy (liberal or otherwise) that accords a greater role for the state, and the provision of basic social goods. 

Exploring and debating different conceptions of democracy is itself a worthwhile democratic process. There are a wide range of models and variations of democracy that can be engaged with and drawn upon. Among these are: direct forms of democracy, inspired by the Athenian experience; democracy based on the republican conception of freedom as non-domination; social welfare versions of democracy, as found in Scandinavia; participatory models that seek to foster a much greater level of involvement from citizens compared to liberalism; deliberative democracy, which emphasises the communicative aspects of democracy; transnational and cosmopolitan proposals that look to transcend the nation-state; and experiments in green democracy, reacting to the growing ecological crisis. Admittedly, a wholesale adoption of any of these alternate models of democracy is – for the time being – unlikely. Nonetheless, there is great potential to incorporate certain aspects into an expanded and revised liberal democratic model. For example, in 2004 the government of British Columbia formed a “citizens’ assembly” of one hundred and sixty near-randomly selected citizens to consider the province’s electoral system and redesign it if necessary. This is an instructive case of incorporating deliberative ideas within a liberal democratic framework. Indeed, entertaining alternative theories of democracy need not entail abandoning liberal commitments and may assist in making it function better. Current historical circumstances differ notably from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the liberal democratic form was constructed, and as such, it is worthwhile considering how other traditions can assist in thinking about contemporary democratisation. 

Given the huge library of democratic knowledge and experience that exists, democracy promoters are handicapping their efforts needlessly by working within an unnecessarily restrictive liberal framework. Burnell’s suggestion that it would be “reprehensible” to promote “models of democracy that are judged too risky to entertain at home” is both overly conservative and unnecessarily peremptory.​[68]​ Indeed, one could make the argument that this already happens: due to the Washington consensus and policies like shock therapy often the model of liberal democracy promoted is different – considerably more liberal – than in established democracies, which have quietly incorporated a strong social democratic dimension, as Berman has convincingly shown.​[69]​ Indeed, the manner in which liberal democracy has changed in the West to respond to different historical circumstances and sets of questions suggests that it is not a predetermined question what the most suitable kind of democracy is. Burnell’s viewpoint is reflective of a pervasive tendency for a commitment to a particular form of democracy, usually a liberal variant, to inhibit the ability to recognise other democratic possibilities latent in specific contexts.​[70]​ External democracy promoters need to be far more sensitive to localised practices that may exist and be understood as democratic, but not correspond to the standard liberal model. This is something Sadiki has highlighted in relation to the Middle East, where a liberal worldview prevents recognition of other democratic possibilities there.​[71]​ 

Building on this suggestion that greater attention needs to be paid to different democratic experiences and possibilities, a more plural approach to democracy promotion centred on communicating and sharing different democratic conceptions has considerable transformational potential. Instead of assessing the “quality” of democracy according to an ill-fitting and problematic Western liberal benchmark, there should be more openness to alternatives, combined with a humility generated through recognition of the various ways democracy can be understood and realised. Learning should be much more dialogic in nature, going in both directions: even the most established democracies likely have something to discover from more recent democratisers.​[72]​ As Teivainen argues,
In the world of democracy promotion, this could mean that the democratic norms should be collectively produced in as democratic spaces as possible, rather than assuming that the fact that norms are based in the European democratic heritage inherently makes them legitimate and suitable for the whole world.​[73]​







One of the few unambiguously positive outcomes of the Bush years is that it has encouraged greater interest in democracy promotion, a set of practices that have become an increasingly institutionalised in international politics in the post-Cold War era. The expansion of scholarship in this area has not been matched by an equal expansion in its scope, however. There continues to be an overwhelming tendency to focus exclusively on empirical case studies and policy prescriptions, usually informed by a set of unstated liberal assumptions. Nothing is necessarily wrong with this per se. The problem stems from the lack of attention directed towards the larger theoretical and conceptual frameworks that inform and shape these practices. One immediate conclusion to be drawn from the argument here is the need for greater reflexivity in how democracy promotion is undertaken and studied, and further consideration of how particular policies are related to specific worldviews and conceptions of democracy.
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